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ABSTRACT: Plato seems to countenance both positive and negative Forms, that is to say, both 
good and bad ones. He may not say so outright, but he invokes both and rejects neither. The 
apparent finality of this impression creates a lack of direct interest in the subject: Plato scholars 
do not give negative Forms much thought except as the prospect relates to something else they 
happen to be doing. Yet when they do give the matter any thought, typically for the sake of a 
prior concern, they try either to support the textual evidence or to contradict it, indicating that 
the evidence does not stand on its own. The purpose of this paper is to determine why they 
tend to affirm or deny the obvious, how they try to confirm or dispute it, and what this says 
about Plato’s position. The strategic vehicle is a comparative case study. The confirmation 
comes from Debra Nails (2013), who needs to embrace negative Forms to demonstrate that the 
unhypothetical first principle of the all is not identical to the Form of the good, something she 
cannot do unless Plato recognizes negative Forms. The contradiction comes from Holger 
Thesleff (2013), who needs to reject negative (Ideal) Forms because the defining feature of his 
(Ideal) Forms is the possession of positive intrinsic value, which cannot be predicated of 
anything negative. Despite defending opposite views, or perhaps because of this, they jointly 
make up for any lack of interest in the scholarly community. I appreciate both, yet side with 
Thesleff. 
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1. ASKING ABOUT NEGATIVE FORMS 
Are there any negative Forms in Plato?1  This is a good question. Here is a better one: 
Why would anyone bother with the first question, given that Plato is widely known to 
speak of such things at least sporadically if not systematically, sometimes even bringing 
up the good, the bad, and the ugly all in the same breath, as he does, for example, both 
in the Republic (475e–476a) and in the Theaetetus (186a)?2  
The negative is never too far to reach in Plato. It is always close at hand and 
typically under scrutiny. Other examples include talk of the just with the unjust 
(Republic 476a; Phaedrus 250a–b), the beautiful with the ugly (Euthydemus 301b; Hippias 
Major 289c–d), and the holy/pious with the unholy/impious (Euthyphro 5c–6e). The list 
can be expanded indefinitely, covering anything of any value amenable to any manner 
of opposition. 
Is it not obvious, then, that Plato welcomes negative Forms alongside the positive 
ones? Evidently not. It must not be so obvious, since we keep asking the first question, 
or insist on answering it when no one has asked it. It is far enough from obvious that 
we routinely disagree on the answer. This is what makes the second question a better 
one. And that is the question I intend to explore in this paper. 
I do not intend merely to answer the question. The answer would fit on this very 
page with room to spare. I will, of course, answer it. But I will also demonstrate that, 
and illustrate how, and explain why, we normally do not think about the matter at all 
until it intersects with something we do happen to be thinking about.3  And I will 
                                                          
1 A couple of caveats may help prevent misunderstandings even if the subject matter is clear enough as it 
is. First, the sense of negativity intended here is not logical negation (not-good, not-just, not-holy, etc.) but 
outright evil (bad, unjust, unholy, etc.). Second, the evil in question is not exclusively moral or religious 
evil but any manifestation whatsoever of negativity (ugliness, ignorance, pestilence, etc.). The focus, then, 
is on the possible connections between negativity, broadly construed, and Plato’s Forms. 
2 References to Plato are by Stephanus number in correlation with the Oxford Classical Texts edition of 
his opera (Plato 1900–1907). Translations of specific passages, except where noted otherwise, are from the 
Hackett edition of his complete works (Plato 1997). 
3 This lack of direct scholarly interest does not extend to the subjects contrasted above (n. 1) with the main 
topic. Hence, when I speak of neglect of negative Forms in Plato, I do not mean to imply either (1) that no 
one is interested in how Plato handles negation or (2) that no one cares what Plato does with the problem 
of evil from a moral or religious perspective. Both are widely discussed, but neither addresses the problem 
on hand. The first issue is invariably about the logic, semantics, epistemology, or ontology of Plato’s 
approach to negation, for example, in places where we encounter not-large, not-beautiful, and not-being 
(Sophist 258b–c), or in those where we find not-Greek and not-ten-thousand (Statesman 262d–e). 
Discussions, to name a few, include: Brown (2012); Lee (1972); Lewis (1976); O’Brien (2013); Prior (1980). 
The second issue, while it can be restricted to Plato’s ethics, is more often about his theodicy, with 
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suggest that, and show how, confronting the second question can help us with the first 
question, even if that may seem counterintuitive because the second is inspired by the 
first. Finally, I will recommend an answer to the first question based on the answer to 
the second question, or more specifically, based on my analysis of possible scenarios 
giving rise to the second question. 
These are not structural or logical parts of the paper. They are, more loosely, aims 
I hope to achieve. This is what I mean by “exploring” the second question instead of 
merely answering it. As for the first question, we will probably never know the answer, 
and we will certainly never agree on it. That is why we have the second question. 
Just how would one go about exploring a question beyond simply answering it? 
Since the second question is about why anyone would bother with the first question, I 
propose to examine what has been said by those who actually have bothered with the 
first question. The most helpful answers will be ones that either affirm or deny negative 
Forms in Plato. Any other answer, say, that the matter is not clear, even if correct, will 
not be as helpful, because we can already tell that the matter is not clear. 
People who do find the matter clear usually have more interesting things to say, if 
only because they are willing to go out on a limb. Debra Nails (2013, 95–101) does this 
as she supports negative Forms in Plato, Holger Thesleff (2013, 40–42) as he rejects 
them.4  They are both clear on the problem and confident in their answers. This, I 
think, is a suitable combination for studying the opposition around negative Forms, 
whether in response to the first question or in connection with the second.5  
                                                                                                                                                         
discussions typically centering on whether evil comes from the body or from the soul or from both. 
Noteworthy contributions include but are not limited to: Cherniss (1954); Chilcott (1923); Hoffleit (1937); 
Mohr (1980); Wood (2009). In contrast to both, the focus of this paper is specifically on whether Plato has 
Forms for bad things in general, that is, for negatively valued, or so charged, phenomena: anything 
undesirable in any way for any reason. It is here that I note a relative lack of immediate and consequential 
interest, but even here, the matter is not in a state of complete disregard. The most prominent of scholars 
have been known to comment, but only in passing, and not with a view to developing a solution: Cherniss 
(1944, 266–267; 1954, 27); Guthrie (1978, 97–100); Herrmann (2007, 223–225); Rist (1967, especially 289–
293); Ross (1951, 167–168); Sedley (2013, 119); Vlastos (1965, 6–7 [= 1973, 64], cf. 1965–1966 [= 1973, 43–
57], a complementary piece). 
4 They are not out on a limb simply because they accept or reject negative Forms in Plato. They are out 
on a limb because of the way they do this, which as I show below, is in each case a Platonic adventure well 
worth taking. 
5 My own answer to the first question, though it is not relevant at this point to what I am doing with the 
second question, is the same as Thesleff’s (2013, 40–42), both in spirit and in print: “Thesleff (2013)” is 
formally “Alican and Thesleff (2013).” I abbreviate the reference as “Thesleff (2013)” not just because it is 
shorter but also because it preserves the third-person narrative adopted here for the case study comparing 
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Any attempt to answer either question stands to benefit from the prior 
consideration of a detail relevant to both: the distinction between the good and other 
Forms. The question of negative Forms, whether the first or the second, comes with a 
distinction between the bad and other (negative) Forms parallel to the one between the 
good and other (positive) Forms. It is conceivable, perhaps even obvious to some, that 
Plato accepts negative Forms, the bad being one of many, if indeed there are any. But it 
is also conceivable, though possibly with greater dissent, that he envisages a hierarchy 
of negative Forms with the bad at the top. The scholarly inspiration for either view 
would likely come from what he does with positive Forms. 
Plato, it is true, tends to bring up the good with the bad, sometimes with additional 
room for the ugly, reminding us today of the ensemble cast of a classic Spaghetti 
Western: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly. This is not to deny the uniquely exalted 
position of the good among the Forms. Plato’s good comes with a status far more 
glorious than the edge given to the good in Westerns, even where Clint Eastwood is the 
good guy. The Republic goes so far as to single out the good as the greatest object of 
study (megiston mathēma [μέγιστον μάθημα] 505a) among the greatest objects of study 
(megista mathēmata [μέγιστα μαθήματα] 503e, 504a). 
Since the greatest objects of study are the Forms, the good is thus the most 
important of the Forms (compared at Republic 504d–e). To cite just a few examples, the 
good is greater than justice and the other virtues (504d), more valuable than knowledge 
and truth (509a), and more substantial than “being” (ousia [οὐσία]), which then gives it 
a superlative mode of existence (509b).6 The good is a superordinate Form. Nothing 
                                                                                                                                                         
the competing positions, one of which happens to be my own. In terms of origination, however, note that 
Thesleff’s independent efforts (1999, 63–67 [= 2009, 447–450]) predate our collaboration. 
6 The “good” as more substantial than “being” is just one interpretation of the corresponding passage. 
The original reference (Republic 509b8–9), epekeina tēs ousias (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας), simply places the good 
beyond being without explaining what that means. One reading, contradicting the one here, takes the 
good’s transcendence of being to strip the good of its own being, though not thereby of its existence 
altogether, for something that does not exist can hardly be good, let alone serving as the good. Another 
reading, confirming the one here, takes the good’s transcendence of being to indicate nothing more than 
the good’s superiority over being, still leaving the good itself with a basic claim to being, the same way 
that Zeus is still a god despite being superior to all the rest. While nothing in this paper turns on 
identifying Plato’s precise meaning in this regard, I do assume without argument, and without 
consequence here, that placing the good beyond being no more voids its being, or precludes its existence, 
than performing beyond expectations fails to meet expectations, or going above and beyond the call of 
duty constitutes a dereliction of duty. Anyone interested in a definitive solution will find the literature 
endless, dating at least as far back as Plotinus, who quotes the relevant passage (epekeina tēs ousias) more 
than any other in Plato, and even more than any other in general, citing it thirty-one times by the count of 
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else is. Or to stick to verifiable facts, the good is the only superordinate Form identified 
as such in the Platonic corpus. And Plato is known to have made a fuss over it outside 
the corpus as well.7  
This being so, how could Plato have been comfortable speaking of the good as if it 
were just another Form, as he plainly does in many places, at least in the passages 
referenced in the opening paragraphs of this paper and in comparably general 
discussions of the good (as a Form) outside the central analogies of the Republic? The 
answer, by no means universally accepted, is that he had no choice. Comfortable or 
not, he had only one Form for the good.8  He might at times have found cause for 
simply mentioning the good among other Forms without making a spectacle of it. But 
having loudly trumpeted the supremacy of the good, both orally and in writing, he 
probably saw no reason to fear being misunderstood in that regard. We are not 
supposed to be confused by his references to the good (as a Form), thinking he meant 
one thing at one time, something else at another. It is all the same superordinate Form 
of the good, sometimes putting in an appearance with ordinary Forms relevant to the 
topic on hand. A unifying perspective affords the most consistent view of the good.9  
                                                                                                                                                         
one careful reader (Halfwassen 2014, 192). Among recent contributions, see Baltes (1997) for a seminal 
statement of the position that the good is beyond being in a comparative sense accommodating its own 
being, and Ferber and Damschen (2015) for a formal proof of the opposite position that the good is 
beyond being in an absolute sense contradicting its own being. 
7 The earliest known source still in existence on Plato’s notorious public lecture (possibly lectures) on the 
good is Aristoxenus (Harm. Elem. 2.30–31) drawing on the testimony of Aristotle. For current commentary, 
see: Gaiser (1980); Ferber (1989); Thesleff (1999, 104–105, 164–165 [= 2009, 485–486, 531]); Alican (2012, 
84–87). 
8 An alternative answer is that Plato had two Forms for the good rather than one. Gerson (2015, 225–242), 
to cite a recent example, holds that Plato must, and does, employ both a “superordinate Idea of the 
Good” and a “coordinate Form of the Good” in order to meet the different needs described here. Our 
disagreement is important in itself but irrelevant in the context of this paper. The focus here is on the 
possibility, reality, and perhaps also psychology of the negative counterparts of Forms, quite apart from 
how many there would be if there were any. Yet anyone interested in the quantitative question, that is, in 
the purported duality of the good, can pursue the matter further through an abundance of references in 
Gerson’s piece. The use he makes of Proclus is especially informative in that regard (2015, 230–235). 
9 One may be inclined to challenge the consistency of interpreting a good listed among ordinary Forms as 
the same good invoked elsewhere as a superordinate Form. But this is like challenging the consistency of 
holding the Bible dear while placing it on the same shelf as ordinary books. We can surely tell the Bible 
apart from all the other books no matter how they are shelved or stacked. The point is not just that the 
Form of the good is still a Form even if it is a superordinate Form, but also that it is still a Form of 
something, hence of the good (or of goodness), even if it is a superordinate Form, also of the good (or of 
goodness). The distinction, then, is not in reference to the good as content, always the same, but in 
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What would be the most consistent view of the bad and of negative Forms in 
general? The good might still be considered the only superordinate Form, with 
ordinary Forms coming in positive, negative, and neutral varieties. Alternatively, the 
bad could be assigned a special status among negative Forms, similar to the one for the 
good among positive Forms.10  One would be in keeping with what Plato says about the 
good (the supremacy of the good thereby prohibiting us from assuming the same for 
the bad), the other would be in keeping with what he does with the good (the 
supremacy of the good thereby inspiring us to do the same with the bad). This evinces 
a subtlety in the possibility of negative Forms. Is this the possibility of ordinary negative 
Forms or is it the possibility of a negative superstructure with the bad at the top of a 
systematic negative hierarchy? 
To repeat, I am not concerned, at least not immediately so, with the question 
opening this paper, not, that is, with whether there are negative Forms in Plato (be it at 
random or within a system). I am concerned, rather, with the one right after that, the 
question why it would occur to anyone to ask (or to answer unprompted) the first 
question, given that the answer seems to be in plain sight with abundant references by 
Plato to what appears to be negative Forms. Since the textual evidence, the direct kind 
anyway, is about ordinary negative Forms, with a superordinate Form of the bad 
requiring extrapolation, I will be pursuing the (second) question only as it pertains to 
ordinary negative Forms. 
I am not against investigating the possibility of a special role for the bad. It just is 
not necessary for what I am doing here. Otherwise, it is only sensible to consider all the 
possibilities where we are not sure of the reality. Nails (2013), for one, has already 
explored this particular possibility. I myself will be content to consider negative Forms 
without regard to whether they are somehow shaped and sustained by the bad as the 
organizing principle and driving force of a negative hierarchy. This is because the 
second-order question with which I am concerned is not about a superordinate Form 
                                                                                                                                                         
reference to the level of the Form, that is, its ontological status, which as it turns out, is also the same, just 
as the Bible is still the Bible even when it sits right next to pulp fiction, and still holy then, if it is holy at all. 
10 It might be objected that the good has a special place among all Forms, not just among the positive 
ones, leaving no room for a comparable place for the bad among negative Forms, nor among all Forms. 
But this will not do. It is difficult to see the good as having anything to do with negative Forms (if there are 
any), and it is outright contradictory to take it as having the same thing to do with negative Forms (if there 
are any) that it has to do with positive Forms. A negative hierarchy is not an abomination. We need good 
reasons to rule it out. The fact that it is not mentioned by Plato is not good enough. Not everything 
accepted by Plato need be mentioned by Plato. 
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of the bad, since the direct and possibly obvious evidence, conclusive or not, is about 
ordinary negativity. 
So, why indeed do we ask whether there are negative Forms in Plato in full 
awareness of passages pointing to negative Forms in Plato? The immediate motivation 
is either to reinforce or to reject the obvious: the appearance of negative Forms. But 
why do either? If Plato seems to be talking about negative Forms, why not just leave it 
at that? We do not bicker and dicker over the presence of positive Forms in Plato. We 
do not, when Plato seems to be talking about positive Forms, ask whether he is really 
talking about positive Forms. Why lock horns over the negative ones? Is it because 
there are more references to positive Forms than to negative Forms? Or is it because 
there seems to be a greater conviction behind positive Forms than behind negative 
Forms? 
I think it is neither. The typical motivation for asking (and for answering) the first 
question is not a reaction, favorable or unfavorable, to putative negative Forms in the 
texts. The typical motivation is the solution of an altogether different problem, 
whatever it may be, that either requires or precludes negative Forms. This is 
manifested in the tendency to raise the question of negative Forms as part of an effort 
to promote a pet theory on a related but different matter that turns on whether there 
are negative Forms in Plato. The pet theory can be a general interpretation of Plato or 
a particular position resting on a general interpretation of Plato. In either case, the 
outlook on negative Forms remains indexed to a general interpretation. Scholars are 
typically not moved to study Plato’s references to what seems to be negative Forms out 
of a genuine or immediate concern for whether Plato’s intention really is to 
countenance negative Forms. How, then, can we verify what they say about the 
matter? 
There is no verification.11  The only relevant consideration is whether we are 
persuaded. Can we trust what these generalists say about negative Forms, suspecting 
all along that they will be tempted to say whatever makes their pet theory work, with 
no special regard, or at most a lesser one, for what may actually be true of negative 
Forms? I believe we can. Let us not exaggerate the potential for bias in the vested 
                                                          
11 That is to say, there is no verification beyond going through Plato’s specific references to putative 
negative Forms and attempting to determine whether the referents really are negative Forms. But we can 
do all that equally well (which happens to be not so well) outside the context of anyone’s general 
interpretation of Plato. The question here is whether to accept the implications of the general 
interpretation for the specific problem. 
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interest. These generalists will, I imagine, be all the more careful with details and 
implications precisely because their own thesis is so special to them. They will want to 
avoid proceeding on the basis of questionable assumptions or hasty generalizations. 
Their particular position on negative Forms will indeed be in conformity with their 
general position on Plato’s thought, but this is not a good reason to reject the latter, 
which is not a bad reason to accept the former. 
Much of what we do with Plato is about trying to understand one thing without 
undermining what we thought we understood about another. This is not, if I may 
continue to speak for all of us engaged in and with Plato, because we are particularly 
slow or sloppy. It is because Plato is not sufficiently forthcoming with his thoughts. 
Although the Platonic corpus is not systematic philosophy, the actual interests and 
thoughts of its author cannot possibly have been as arbitrary as his combined output 
makes them out to be. A general interpretation will therefore be as useful as the extent 
to which it exposes a basic outlook underlying the competing perspectives in the 
Platonic corpus while uniting the complementary ones. A general interpretation that 
works, especially one with great explanatory power, can be an acceptable proxy for a 
specific theory on a special topic. 
This does not mean that we must accept whatever a general theory, even a good 
one, assumes or implies in regard to negative Forms. Nor does it mean that between 
any two general theories, let us say good ones, we must favor the one that is more 
general. What it does mean is that we ought not to reject a position on negative Forms 
just because it was not conceived specifically as a solution to the problem of negative 
Forms. And between any number of equally appealing positions, or in this case, 
metapositions, we have to decide which one has greater explanatory power, not which 
one is more general (though the same one could be both). 
Is this circular? If anything can be a little circular, then this would seem to fit the 
bill, perhaps not as a full circle but certainly as a winding spiral. We are to decide what 
to do with certain details based on what a successful general theory tells us to do, while 
judging the success of that theory by whether, among other things, it is able to make 
sense of those details. However suspicious this approach may seem, it is not necessarily 
a problem. It can, of course, turn into a problem if handled badly, but it does not start 
out as one by design. It is, in fact, a common feature (of one way) of trying to 
understand Plato. 
There is nothing wrong with trying to figure out Plato’s overall philosophical 
outlook on the basis of what he says about certain issues (given the prohibitively 
exhaustive and jointly inconsistent catalog of everything he says about every issue), 
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while also trying to determine what he says about certain issues with the help of what 
we take to be his overall philosophical outlook. This is both acceptable and helpful so 
long as the set of issues invoked while going in one direction is not identical to the set of 
issues clarified while going in the opposite direction.12  We cannot afford to dismiss the 
spiral of evidence as circular reasoning if we are unable to get very far with the linear 
kind. But we also do not have to give up a close reading of relevant passages. The point 
is that a holistic approach works, not that nothing else does. It need not be followed 
exclusively, nor even very strictly.13  It just ought not to be rejected out of hand. 
This is how both Nails and Thesleff handle negative Forms. Each one proceeds 
with an assumption about negative Forms in conformity with their respective positions 
on a broader issue, that is, with their interpretations of Plato on a wider scale, but each 
one also introduces evidentiary benchmarks (in the form of passages in the corpus) to 
demonstrate that the assumption is consistent with the texts. Nails (2013) portrays Plato 
as reveling in negative Forms, complete with a hierarchy led by (the Form of) the bad, 
mirroring the better known order of (the Form of) the good.14  Thesleff (2013) gives us a 
more conservative ontologist, wary of the negative and reluctant to make too much of 
it, least of all by countenancing Forms of that nature. Nails’s Plato is open to all 
abstractions as potential Forms, which is why he does not weed out the negative ones. 
What this means is not that her Plato has a Form for every abstraction but that he is 
willing to consider them all without prejudice. He may (or may not) have other reasons 
to limit the population of Forms, but blocking the negative is not one of them. In 
contrast, Thesleff ’s Plato is preoccupied with (positive) value, eager to privilege the 
Forms that possess it, and ready to dismiss or discount the ones that do not. This is the 
basic difference between them. 
Nails may be said to have the easier job because Plato already appears to endorse 
                                                          
12 And it may be acceptable even then. A circular method of interpretation could arguably be judged by its 
propensity to predict or explain relevant episodic details, especially bits and pieces that are not explained 
as well by competing methods of interpretation. 
13 Even Quine warns against exaggerating holism, at least his own holism, specifically by taking it to 
preclude empirical inquiry altogether: “I must caution against overstating my holism. Observation 
sentences do have their empirical content individually, and other sentences are biased individually to 
particular empirical content in varying degrees” (1986, 427). 
14 Nails does not insist on a superstructure of negative Forms versus a superstructure of positive Forms. 
This is my interpretation of a part of what she does in her approach to negative Forms (Nails 2013, 95–
101). However, my assessment of her demonstration that Plato accepts negative Forms does not depend on 
this particular interpretation. So, I prefer to explain it only at the end (section 5), where it would no longer 
be disrupting the discussion in progress. 
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negative Forms, at least insofar as he seems here and there to be talking about them. 
By the same token, Nails may be said to have the tougher job if only because whatever 
she says (about negative Forms) will tend to be interpreted as confirming the obvious 
(regarding negative Forms). In an important sense, however, neither one has this job at 
all, since each one sets out to do something else entirely. 
In the final analysis, alignment with or against either Nails or Thesleff will not be a 
matter of whether they do a good job with negative Forms. If we were in a position to 
judge that, we would not need to mine their derivative input for primary insight. It will 
instead be a matter of whether they enrich our understanding of Plato. Even if they 
both do so, and certainly if they both do so equally well, a choice will be necessary, for 
their views are mutually inconsistent despite the absence of a direct contradiction. It 
will then be a matter of whose Plato is closer to our own. And since the only sense in 
which we can have our own Plato is distributive rather than collective, I will be 
summoning my own where necessary. 
I do not mean to ignore other contributions. But these two stand out with the 
strength of their stake in the matter. My aim, in any case, is not to survey the literature. 
It is to show that and how and why the question of negative Forms tends to be treated 
as a derivative problem, and more importantly, to see if anything in that treatment can 
be adopted toward a better understanding of the primary problem. A focused case 
study is better suited to the task than a sweeping survey. To return to the distinction in 
the beginning of the paper, this means exploring the second question for insight into 
the first question. 
2. EMBRACING NEGATIVE FORMS (DEBRA NAILS) 
Nails (2013) finds plenty of room for negative Forms in Plato. She finds it in the course 
of developing a separate argument (2013, 88–101) that requires negative Forms (95–101) 
as a premise.15  Her main concern is with a problem that works out the way she wants 
only if Plato countenances negative Forms. It could possibly go her way even without 
negative Forms, but that is a detail best left for later, especially since negative Forms 
make her argument stronger than otherwise. 
Fortunately, the default position on negative Forms happens to be that such Forms 
                                                          
15 A critique of this argument may be found in Franklin (2013, 102–109), but the objections there are not 
relevant here. 
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do belong in Plato’s ontology.16  Yet Nails expands on the default position instead of 
merely drawing on it. She not only presents evidence and arguments in support of 
negative Forms but also takes issue with the common objection that negative Forms 
(e.g., the bad, the ugly, the unjust) are nothing more than privations of positive ones 
(e.g., the good, the beautiful, the just). Nails finds this inconsistent with the texts (2013, 
96). Her own reading is that Plato ranks negative Forms right up there with positive 
ones, holding them on a conceptual and methodological par with their more popular 
counterparts. 
Nails thus maintains not just that there are negative Forms in Plato but further that 
their claim to being a Form is just as valid as the corresponding claim of positive 
Forms. Positive or negative, a Form is a Form is a Form. Hence, the ugly, the unjust, 
and any other negative Forms are all Forms in their own right, not privations or 
absences of their respective counterparts among positive Forms. The bad, however, 
stands out: It is not an ordinary Form. Nor is it merely the absence of the good. It is, 
like the good, a special or privileged Form. To borrow the adjective favored by Nails, it 
is a “robust” Form (2013, 96, 99, 100). 
Convinced that negative Forms are more than the ontological residue of imagining 
away the positive ones, Nails illustrates her position through the framework of 
opposition in Platonic metaphysics. She distinguishes between two basic manifestations 
of opposition in Forms (2013, 96): Some Forms are opposed to each other as the 
extreme ends of a continuum: e.g., motion and rest; sameness and difference; hot and 
cold. Others are mutually exclusive with no gradation in between: e.g., life and death; 
odd and even; finite and infinite. The main difference, beyond the association of 
mutual exclusiveness with the second group but not with the first (at least not explicitly 
so), seems to be that the paired elements in the first group (but evidently not those in 
the second) “might well be described as privations of one another, though neither need 
be considered negative” (2013, 96). 
What does this mean for negative Forms? We get a better idea through the position 
of the good and the bad in her classification. Nails places the good and the bad in the 
                                                          
16 The acknowledgment of a default position may seem inconsistent with the search for an answer. 
Actually, it is quite consistent, given that the aim of the paper is to answer the second question (why we 
keep confirming or challenging the default position) rather than, or at least before, the first (whether there 
is a default position at all). The sense in which the acceptance of negative Forms constitutes the default 
position is that, despite the fact that scholars are typically not concerned with the subject unless and until 
it intersects with a subject they are concerned with, there is some prima facie textual evidence in support 
of it and no particular textual evidence in contradiction of it. 
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first category (2013, 96). Given her earlier distinctions, this would seem to suggest (1) 
that the good and the bad are not mutually exclusive and (2) that the good and the bad 
may possibly be privations of each other, though neither one need (for this reason 
alone) be considered negative (as against the other as positive). Since she also 
acknowledges that “there is a vast range of the neither-good-nor-bad (NGNB),” we 
know further (3) that the good and the bad are not jointly exhaustive. We can combine 
the first and third implications, leaving the second as it is in essentials: (1) the good and 
the bad are neither mutually exclusive nor jointly exhaustive; (2) the good and the bad 
can (but need not) be privations of each other without either one being negative. 
The second implication worries me. For one thing, acknowledging that the good 
and the bad may reasonably be considered privations of each other (and presumably 
just as reasonably not) seems strategically to be the opposite of what Nails ought to be 
doing, given that she does not want the bad (or any other putative negative Form) to 
turn out to be a privation. For another, adding that this, the possibility of a 
symmetrical privation relation, need not make either the good or the bad negative, also 
seems inimical to what she should be promoting, negative Forms. If neither the good 
nor the bad has to be negative, then neither one has to be a negative Form, and if 
neither one has to be a negative Form, then why are we talking about them, and where 
are the negative Forms? Without anything negative established in the scenario, the 
context is not about showing that a negative Form counts as a Form in its own right as 
opposed to a mere privation. It is instead about showing that some Form bearing an 
opposite, but itself not necessarily a negative Form, counts as a Form in its own right as 
opposed to a mere privation (and that the same holds for its opposite). Furthermore, 
the bad would, it seems to me, have to be considered negative if anything at all can be. 
How can the bad not be negative? It is the very embodiment of the negative. It is the 
common denominator of negativity. And it is, according to Nails herself, the sole 
explanation of destruction (2013, 94, 99, 100). 
Perhaps I am misinterpreting what Nails is saying. Her reluctance to diagnose the 
negative might, in this context, indicate simply that even if the good and the bad were 
privations of each other, which they are not (according to Nails), it would still not be 
clear which is the substantial element and which the privation, and hence, also not 
clear which is the positive element and which the negative. That is not quite it. Nails 
does not seem to be saying either that it would not be clear which is the substantial 
element and which the privation or that it would not be clear which is the positive 
element and which the negative. She seems to be saying that neither one would have to 
be negative even if each were the privation of the other. The only commitment she 
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actually makes in this regard is that “neither need be considered negative” (2013, 96). 
This would correct my first mistake, my construal of Nails as admitting the possibility 
and reasonability of taking the bad as a mere privation of the good just because she 
admits the possibility and reasonability of taking the bad as a privation of the good (in 
placing the good and the bad in a category of examples that “might well be described 
as privations of one another”) (2013, 96). 
I do not know whether Nails would agree with any of this, but her correction of my 
mistake would probably have to run deeper, just as the mistake seems to do. The 
mistake to be corrected may be as basic as my supposing that the bad as a privation of 
the good would be a privation rather than a Form as opposed to a privation that is (or 
has) a Form. This would be a fundamental disagreement: whether a privation can also 
be a Form (or whether a privation can have a Form). I doubt that we can settle that 
debate here as an incidental concern, but even the recognition of it as the source of our 
disagreement on related issues would be a step toward constructive dialogue. Either 
way, there is still the matter of what would be my second mistake, my construal of Nails 
as leaving room for a bad that is not negative, or more specifically, a negative Form. I 
might here have distorted an otherwise innocuous general observation that a privation 
need not be negative (whether or not the bad actually is). Maybe that, too, would 
resolve itself upon the resolution of the more fundamental question at the root of our 
disagreement. 
Yet even with all my misconceptions corrected, we might still disagree on the 
correlation between negativity and privation, despite agreeing that not all privations 
are negative. I would be inclined to think that the assignment of the status of privation 
proceeds from the prior identification of a positive element against which the privation 
is considered negative. It is not the other way around: We do not neutrally, that is, 
dispassionately, identify pairs of elements that are privations of each other, proceeding 
from there to value assignments. There might be cases where we do start out by 
identifying pairs of elements that are privations of each other, but those are cases where 
we consider neither element negative and where, therefore, there are no value 
assignments to be made. The contrasting elements in the first cluster of passages Nails 
presents are excellent examples of privation without valuation: motion and rest; 
sameness and difference; hot and cold (2013, 96). But the cases where one element is 
positive and the other negative do not get those value assignments after a neutral 
identification of the privation relation. What happens instead is that we first sort out 
the good (the positive) and the bad (the negative) and then decide that the bad is a 
privation of the good (if we actually do believe that the bad is a privation of the good). 
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What is the problem if the examples Nails provides are excellent? The problem is that 
her good and her bad do not belong in that category of examples. The good is good 
and the bad is bad. The question of value does arise. 
Let us grant Nails all her claims and see what follows: The good and the bad are 
neither mutually exclusive nor jointly exhaustive, and neither one of them has to be 
negative even if each one is the privation of the other. The upshot of all this, together 
with the supporting evidence (2013, 96–99), seems to be that the bad is a Form in its 
own right and that this is the case with negative Forms in general. Does this really 
follow as a conclusion? There is a strong presumption in its favor, emphatically so as 
Nails turns to citation, but there is also some clutter, which may admittedly be peculiar 
to my reading as opposed to her writing: If the good and the bad are not jointly 
exhaustive, then neither one alone can be the privation of the other (thus validating the 
original opposition of Nails) regardless of whether they are mutually exclusive, and 
regardless of which one, if either, might be negative. This is because the absence of the 
good stands to leave us not just with the bad but also with the neither-good-nor-bad as 
Nails correctly and repeatedly points out. Nails does not seem to need all her initial 
claims, though invoking them all does not damage her position.17  
None of my objections so far overturns Nails’s opposition to privation as an 
explanation of negative Forms, which, on that explanation, do not count as Forms. Any 
attempt to prove her wrong would have to contend with the examples she adduces 
from the Platonic corpus (2013, 96–99), especially since her main point against the 
privation interpretation is that “the texts do not allow it” (2013, 96). Nails organizes the 
relevant citations in two separate clusters, which together cover most but not all of the 
Plato references in her article. The first cluster (2013, 97), comprising six passages, one 
each from six dialogues, constitutes evidence that Plato found a reciprocal relationship 
between knowing the good and knowing the bad. The second cluster (2013, 97–99), 
comprising nine passages, all from the Republic, illustrates that “the good and its results 
are kept distinct from the bad and its results” (2013, 97). The first cluster supports her 
claim that negative Forms are Forms in their own right and not mere privations of their 
positive counterparts. The second cluster may also be said to do this, at least with some 
of the references, but its main function is to fortify her broader position against 
                                                          
17 The identification of a category where paired elements “might well be described as privations of one 
another, though neither need be considered negative” (Nails 2013, 96) becomes superfluous where the 
elements in question are not jointly exhaustive, and therefore, cannot be privations of each other in the 
sense of either one alone representing what is entailed by the absence of the other. 
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equating the unhypothetical first principle of the all with the Form of the good. This is 
what she is really after. 
Nevertheless, it is still possible to say something relevant about her perspective on 
negative Forms without engaging her at the level of specific examples. Let us go back 
to basics: What is the motivation? Why does she need negative Forms? She needs them 
because Plato has to accept negative Forms alongside positive Forms if Nails is to 
establish her thesis that the unhypothetical first principle of the all is not identical to 
the Form of the good (2013, 88–101, especially 95–101). She cannot do this unless her 
Plato accepts and works with negative Forms in addition to whatever else makes the 
world go round. Perhaps it could also be done in some other way, but this is the way 
she does it, and to be able to do it this way, she needs there to be bona fide negative 
Forms, or rather, she needs for Plato to believe that there are bona fide negative Forms. 
Under her interpretation, the Form of the good cannot account for harm or 
destruction, and this is why it cannot be identical to the unhypothetical first principle 
of the all, which can account for harm and destruction (and for everything else). The 
unhypothetical first principle of the all, then, covers more ground than the Form of the 
good. But it also covers more ground than the combined total associated with the Form 
of the good and the Form of the bad. This is because it alone includes “the vast range 
of the neither-good-nor-bad (NGNB)” (2013, 96). In some sense, the unhypothetical 
first principle of the all is equivalent to the Form of the good plus the Form of the bad 
plus everything in between or beyond, specifically “all those NGNB things made good 
or bad through their use” (2013, 99). 
This is not the whole story. My summary is missing a key ingredient present in the 
original: the anthropocentricity of Plato’s Form of the good, and for that matter, of his 
Form of the bad (if there is one). Nails takes this up in several places: (1) “Plato’s form of 
the good is anthropocentric” (2013, 95). (2) “Plato has a robust form of the bad, a form 
as intelligible as the others and yet — like the good — an anthropocentric form 
without application to the universe as a whole” (2013, 96). (3) “[G]ood and bad are 
importantly, though not exclusively, anthropocentric” (2013, 100). This suggests that the 
unhypothetical first principle of the all covers not just the good, the bad, and the 
neither, but all that plus the nonanthropocentric senses of both the good and the bad 
(and perhaps also the nonanthropocentric sense of the neither if it, too, admits of that 
distinction).18  
                                                          
18 Nails (2013, 94–96, 99–100) provides both reasons and references for her characterization of the Form of 
the good as anthropocentric. I might add, without a personal inclination either way, that her claim seems 
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Right or wrong, this observation has implications outside the context in which it is 
presented. The anthropocentricity postulated seems to trickle down to places Nails 
does not discuss (because she does not need to for her immediate purposes). If the 
anthropocentricity of the good and the bad in Plato is part of what makes both the 
Form of the good and the Form of the bad less comprehensive than the unhypothetical 
first principle of the all, should it not pose an additional problem such that neither the 
Form of the good nor the Form of the bad is as comprehensive as its 
nonanthropocentric version would be? Under Nails’s interpretation, Plato’s 
(anthropocentric) Form of the good is too narrow not only as the unhypothetical first 
principle of the all but also as the (unqualified) Form of the good. It therefore does not 
work as the Form of the good it is purported to be. I am here observing rather than 
opposing what she is doing. 
As for Nails’s own observation, anthropocentricity is an integral part of her 
opposition to the tendency to identify the unhypothetical first principle of the all with 
the Form of the good. It is so important that she could have based her entire case on 
this premise alone, had she been inclined to do so, without ever requiring a robust 
Form of the bad. She could have held the difference between the unhypothetical first 
principle of the all and the Form of the good to rest on the generality of the former and 
the anthropocentricity of the latter. This is not an objection to Nails such that she 
should have done this instead. It is a note to the reader such that she could have done 
this instead. That is how relevant and important her observation is (especially for her 
own thesis). 
On the other hand, had she done it that way, she would have ended up with a less 
significant difference between the unhypothetical first principle of the all and the Form 
of the good. She would have had to settle for an unhypothetical first principle of the all 
that is basically the Form of the good without an anthropocentric bias. And she would 
not have needed negative Forms for that. As it is, she does need them. It is to meet that 
need that she adduces textual evidence supporting the existence of negative Forms, 
particularly the Form of the bad but also others. 
I am not convinced, however, that the evidence is conclusive. I will not challenge 
her examples one by one. They obviously support her position. It is the default position 
anyway. What I want to know is whether the reasoning that leads Nails to her position 
                                                                                                                                                         
to be confirmed by the author of the Seventh Letter, who declares that “there is nothing worth mentioning 
that is either good or bad to creatures without souls, but good and evil exist only for a soul, either joined 
with a body or separated from it” (334e–335a). 
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on negative Forms as genuine Forms successfully blocks the alternative that they are 
instead privations of corresponding positive Forms. The crux of her argument seems to 
be this: “Since the good that opposes the bad and makes NGNB [neither-good-nor-
bad] things good cannot cause harm or destruction, but harm and destruction do exist, 
there must be something else that harms and destroys” (2013, 99). Why? Why must 
there be something else that harms and destroys? 
Nails and Plato have an answer: “The bad is what destroys and corrupts, and the 
good is what preserves and benefits... And do you say that there is a good and a bad 
for everything? ... for the good would never destroy anything, nor would anything 
neither good nor bad” (Republic 608e4–7, 609b1–2, as quoted by Nails 2013, 99). But 
this is not what I am asking. I am not asking why there must be something that harms 
and destroys. I am asking why there must be something else that harms and destroys. 
Might not the privation of the good work as an explanation of the bad, naturally 
covering harm and destruction as well, without requiring a separate cause dedicated to 
negativity: a robust Form of the bad?19  
An apple a day keeps the doctor away. Take the apple away, the doctor comes to 
stay. Is this not a good explanation? It is admittedly not the best, but what exactly is 
wrong with it? There are, to be sure, better accounts of physical ailment. Yet if the 
absence of the apple is not the cause of harm and destruction, or in this case a 
sufficient explanation of disease, this is because its presence never was the source of 
health in the first place, nor a sufficient explanation thereof. What we are facing is not 
an explanation that works in the first case but not in the second. What we are facing is 
an explanation that cannot consistently be dismissed in the second case unless it is 
dismissed in the first. Even if it is not a good explanation, or the correct explanation, it 
is a coherent explanation because it anchors both the positive and the negative 
accounts to the same factor, present in one case, absent in the other. This would not be 
the first time Plato came up with an explanation that did not strike our fancy.20  
Ain’t no sunshine when she’s gone! Do we really need another explanation? Not if 
we are to enjoy the song. But if we would rather have a weather report, then we need 
more information if not an altogether different explanation. This one has limited value 
                                                          
19 Thesleff, it seems, would have joined me in this reaction even before our collaboration (Alican and 
Thesleff 2013, 40–42): “Evil is no active force: evil is imperfection and the chaotic state of lower-level 
tendencies getting the upper hand” (Thesleff 1999, 124 [= 2009, 505]). 
20 Note by way of connection with Alican and Thesleff (2013) that if Plato indeed holds Forms proper 
(“Ideal Forms”) to have positive intrinsic value, he might well associate negativity with the absence of the 
positive (an absence that can all the same be filled partly by the neutral). 
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in its present form. Although we know not to expect sunshine when she is gone, there is 
no guarantee there will be sunshine when she is here, just an implication to that effect 
for those who want to see it. Nor do we know for sure that she is absent every time the 
sun is absent. We know only the reverse, that the sun is absent whenever she is. 
These are all gaps in the association but they are easily fixed. The real problem is 
hidden underneath. Let us ignore the superficial issues and turn to the real problem. 
Let us assume, therefore, not that the song depicts a partial correlation, one limited to 
the mutual absence of the sun and the heroine, but that it draws on a complete causal 
relationship such that she bringeth forth the sun just as surely as she taketh it away.21  
This must be what is meant anyway, given that we are talking, with poetic license, 
about someone so special. The problem, however, is that her absence is not as 
revealing as her presence: No sunshine. That we know. But how do we explain the 
rain? Where does all the snow come from? What brings on the tornadoes and the 
hurricanes? 
Suppose there ain’t no sunshine and she’s gone. Should we expect a drizzle or a 
blizzard? Or just overcast skies? It is hard to tell. It would help if we knew whether 
there’s a bad moon on the rise. It might help even more if we knew whether there’s 
trouble on the way. The absence of sunshine does not always mean we’re in for nasty 
weather. But that is just when to expect it. Although it need not rain cats and dogs 
every time the sun is gone (as is she), it would indeed be more likely to do so (if at all) 
when the sun is gone (as is she). The poet probably intended the absence of sunshine as 
a blanket reference to conditions conducive to bad weather, ranging from scattered 
showers to biblical floods. But where is the poetry in that? We leave the art behind as 
we turn to the science, and vice versa, but we need not be ignorant of one just because 
we are focusing on the other. 
Plato is a poet too. He knows very well that the absence of the good does not 
automatically translate into the presence of the bad. He trusts us to make that 
distinction — and to trust him to make it in silence. It is as a poet, I think, that he 
leaves it all to the good, and to its absence, not bothering to fill in the details with the 
bad. Nor do we ourselves need to invent a Form for the bad to work out those details. 
                                                          
21 This is still poetic shorthand for the causal relationship, which can be expressed as the mutual 
satisfaction of the following conditions: (1) there is no sunshine when she is gone; (2) she is gone when 
there is no sunshine; (3) there is sunshine when she is here; (4) she is here when there is sunshine. From the 
opposite perspective, there is never a case when she is here but the sun is not, or when the sun is here but 
she is not. And none of this obviously has anything to do with the difference between day and night, 
instead representing a daytime difference between sunshine and its absence (obstruction). 
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The possibility is there, but the requirement is not: If the absence of the good is no 
more likely, in any particular case, to leave us with the bad than it is to leave us with 
the neither-good-nor-bad, a Form for the bad is no more useful, or necessary, than a 
Form for the neither-good-nor-bad. Given that they both represent the privation of the 
good, and given that they do that better together than on their own, why would we 
ever need a Form for one but not for the other? I do not believe we need a Form for 
either. I believe we have all the Forms we need. 
3. REJECTING NEGATIVE FORMS (HOLGER THESLEFF) 
Thesleff (2013) rejects negative Forms in Plato.22 He maintains that any and all apparent 
negative Forms are instead negative concepts or abstractions. Since Forms belong to 
the highest ranks of Plato’s ontology, while mere concepts and abstractions do not, 
Thesleff thus stands out with a more restricted population for Forms than 
acknowledged by most other scholars. 
But where does Plato draw this distinction between Forms and mere concepts? 
Where does he explain the difference between abstractions that are Forms (or have 
Forms) and abstractions that are not Forms (or do not have Forms)? That would be 
nowhere.23  Plato does not employ (or have) a second-order language to describe Forms 
in terms of concepts or abstractions. We have to use our own if we are so inclined. 
Thesleff ’s point, on the other hand, is not that the distinction is explicit in this or that 
dialogue but that it goes better with what we know of Plato than does a predisposition 
to accept absolutely anything as a Form. 
We would not be able to get past the first few pages of the Parmenides if we were to 
assign the same weight to everything admitting of abstraction. The Parmenides gives us a 
Socrates who is certain that there are Forms for justice, beauty, and goodness (130b), 
certain again that there are no Forms for hair, mud, or dirt (130c–d), but ambivalent as 
to whether there might be any for man, fire, and water (130c). The sample size may not 
be large enough to draw conclusions about the general population with any 
                                                          
22 His most forceful stand is in Alican and Thesleff (2013, 40–42), though his resistance can be traced back 
to Thesleff (1999, 63–67 [= 2009, 447–450]). 
23 I am not claiming that concepts and abstractions are the same thing. I am merely reporting that Forms 
tend to be compared and contrasted, and indeed even confused, both with concepts and with abstractions. 
See Alican and Thesleff (2013, 29–33, 44) and Alican (2014, 35–37, 44–52; 2015, 323) for what we might, in 
the absence of instructions by Plato, be able to make of the distinction between Forms and either mere 
concepts or mere abstractions. 
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confidence, but the premium on value is hard to miss. Everything that makes the cut 
happens to be intrinsically good. Everything else is met with either hesitation or out-
and-out rejection. The defining difference is intrinsic value. The only things the 
passage identifies as Forms are those that are good in themselves (valuable for their 
own sakes). If those lacking positive intrinsic value are at best held in abeyance, and 
just as easily dismissed altogether, why should there be, and how could there be, any 
Forms that carry negative value? Or to put it crudely, if hair, mud, and dirt are not 
good enough, how can ugliness or injustice or ignorance ever qualify? 
The answer I am fishing for, rather transparently at that, is that they never can. I 
am, of course, cheating. Such a controversial conclusion is not established with a single 
reference unless the message is beyond dispute. This particular passage is open to 
interpretation. The restriction imposed on the population of Forms is not as 
authoritative as it might seem. We have evidence to the contrary, for example, in the 
character of Parmenides, who immediately opposes (130e) Socrates’s inclination to 
reject Forms for “worthless” things such as hair, mud, and dirt. This then vitiates the 
sole reason for invoking the passage as supporting Plato’s rejection of negative Forms. 
We do not know whether to look to Socrates or to Parmenides (or to both or to neither) 
for what Plato thinks about the matter. It is clear, at any rate, that we are not to ignore 
the explicit warning of the older and wiser Parmenides. Even more indicative is the 
self-criticism of Socrates, who expresses misgivings about the consistency of attributing 
Forms to some things while denying them of others (130d). Must the assignment of 
Forms be so comprehensive as to leave nothing without a Form?24  Whatever the 
answer to that question, there is too much dramatic opposition here to read this 
passage as a categorical rejection of negative Forms. 
Yet the Parmenides is not the only dialogue to spurn negative Forms. The Forms 
mentioned in the central myth of the Phaedrus (246e–249d), each one favored beyond a 
doubt and positive without exception, are entirely consistent with the ones eagerly 
accepted as Forms in the Parmenides (130b). Beheld upon the completion of the cosmic 
ascent of the soul, these Forms include justice, temperance, knowledge, and such 
(247d), together with beauty (249d, 250b, 250d–e), which shines more brightly than the 
rest, with glimpses of it available in our phenomenal experience as well. The list is 
representative rather than exhaustive. But it is easy to tell that hair and mud and dirt 
are not meant to be included. And there is no mention of man or fire or water. Nor is 
there an elderly sage warning us not to underestimate such things. They are not there 
                                                          
24 See Alican (2017) for the possibility of Formless things (13–15) and empty Forms (16–29). 
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anyway. All we have is the good stuff. 
This is the sublime vision awaiting the soul (of the philosopher) upon its attainment 
of spiritual purification and intellectual enlightenment, not to mention the various 
gods, who are presumably already purified and enlightened to some extent even before 
the journey. Mortals and gods alike, the latter with greater success, travel to the outer 
edges of the heavens to behold the Forms in their full glory.25  No wonder there is no 
room in the Phaedrus for any of the muck rejected in the Parmenides. Judging by the short 
list (justice, temperance, knowledge, beauty), nary a negative Form will be found there 
either. This is no place for negative Forms. And that, contends Thesleff, is because 
there is no place for negative Forms. 
Thesleff does not allow any reification of negativity in his interpretation of Plato. 
But why should everything negative (e.g., badness, ugliness, injustice) be restricted to 
insubstantial concepts while positive phenomena (e.g., goodness, beauty, justice) are 
hailed as fully fledged Forms? And what are we to make of the various neutral 
abstractions that look like they belong somewhere in the middle, apparently qualifying 
as more than concepts, though hardly deserving designation as Forms? No neutral 
items we come up with (nor the ones that come up in the Parmenides) will be as good as 
the positive ones, but they are also not going to be as bad as the negative ones. Would 
they not need a category of their own: “neither-Forms-nor-concepts,” or more 
perspicuously, “not-quite-Forms-but-more-than-concepts,” possibly to be abbreviated 
for convenience to something like “überconcepts”? Maybe so. Classification and 
specification can be useful, but a single category may not be enough. The category of 
the neutral in the Parmenides, for example, does not seem to be homogeneous, admitting 
as it does of significant items such as man, fire, and water, on the one hand, and of 
insignificant ones such as hair, mud, and dirt, on the other. If Thesleff is going to be 
insisting on a distinction between the positive and the negative, associating Forms with 
one but not with the other, should he not tell us what to do with everything in 
between? He should. And he does. 
Thesleff is not suspicious only of the negative. He is rather vigilant across the 
board. He can even be open to one neutral Form while rejecting another. He is picky. 
And this is the impetus behind his opposition to the negative. It is perhaps best to start 
with the negative, even though that is not where Thesleff starts. He does, after all, 
reject the negative, lock, stock, and barrel, no matter how flexible or finicky he is about 
                                                          
25 The myth (Phaedrus 246e–249d) has two distinct parts, starting with the gods (246e–247e) and moving on 
to human souls (248a–249d). 
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everything else. Indeed, let us ask why. 
Thesleff ’s resistance to negativity is motivated by a vision of Plato’s ontology that 
precludes negative Forms.26  This may seem like a circular answer, but it is the actual 
reason. This is not a direct answer, as he has never been asked the question, at least not 
in print. Nevertheless, this is his position. Thesleff has to reject negative Forms. 
The vision that dictates this rejection covers more than Plato’s ontology.27  It is, in 
essence, a general outlook on Plato’s philosophical orientation, thereby observable in 
his ontology as well. And the outlook simply does not work with negative Forms. But 
Thesleff also prepares individual cases against some of the strongest candidates for 
negative Forms (2013, 40–42) independently of the general outlook that already 
precludes negative Forms. Because of this overlapping coverage, it may at times be 
difficult to tell whether he is opposed to negative Forms because the cumulative 
evidence shows that Plato is opposed to them or because his own overarching 
perspective on Plato rules out negative Forms. 
This, however, is not a problem. If we find Thesleff convincing, it should not 
matter whether this is because we find his overall interpretation compelling, and 
consequently stand ready to reject anything that contradicts it, or because we find his 
specific objections to prominent examples of negative Forms persuasive. The general 
vision may be more effective than the specific objections, given that it is difficult to 
prove the negative, especially piecemeal: this one is not a negative Form, that one is 
not a negative Form, and so on ad infinitum. 
Thesleff should not, in any event, be expected to present a case against each and 
every putative negative Form in the Platonic corpus. There are surely not as many 
reasons for rejecting negative Forms as there are candidates for negative Forms. One 
should be able to detect a pattern for rejection after a few key cases. And Thesleff does 
present a few key cases (2013, 40–42). They might even be sufficiently representative of 
                                                          
26 The vision I have in mind, as elucidated below in the main text, is the stratified monism Thesleff and I 
have been championing, both separately and together, as the proper way of reading Plato. The 
inspiration originates with Thesleff (1989, 4, n. 14, 14, n. 45, 24–25; 1993, 17–45; explained: 20–22, 35–37; 
illustrated: 23–35; 1999 [= 2009, 383–506]). The present version takes shape in our collaborative account 
in Alican and Thesleff (2013, 11–47, especially 13, 17–19). The interpretive platform continues to unfold in 
Alican (2014, 2015, 2017), extending rather than either abandoning or merely retracing the main lines of 
the joint initiative. 
27 Critics tend to be quick to find an anachronism in such statements. I am not suggesting that Plato 
himself distinguished between the various branches of philosophy, just that there is no harm in our doing 
so, even in discussing his philosophy. 
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the whole for readers to decide whether to side with Thesleff or to stand against him. I 
personally find the general vision more persuasive, or rather, persuasive enough not to 
require the specific cases to serve as additional proofs, better taken instead as 
supplementary considerations working in an explanatory capacity.28  
Regarding the general vision, a skeletal sketch is all we need here. This is not just 
because the original is easily accessible and clear enough on its own (Thesleff 1989; 
1993; 1999 [= 2009, 383–506]; 2013) but also because expository and critical 
commentary is readily available (Alican 2014, 2015, 2017). Thesleff ’s Plato is not the 
metaphysical dualist he is often made out to be. This Plato does not distinguish 
between the world in which we live and the world in which the Forms dwell. They are 
one and the same. This Plato handles the difference between Forms and particulars 
with a gradation of reality in the only world there is. Thesleff describes this gradation 
as a hierarchical stratification of reality with two main levels and countless subdivisions 
in between (1993, 20–22, 35–37; 1999, 11–52 [= 2009, 397–436]; 2013, 13, 17–19). 
The Forms occupy the top level but not as a uniform class of entities. They are not 
simply one kind of thing, undifferentiated in any way, or at least in any way that 
matters. The intelligible phenomena we have come to know, one and all, as Forms, are 
actually a motley crew of ontologically distinct and distinctive constructs (or entities) 
emerging from (or discovered through) Plato’s thought experiments in concept 
formation.29  These “Forms” are best taken up in three categories: Ideal Forms; 
Conceptual Forms; Relational Forms (2013, 19–23, 26–38, 43–45). 
 
• Ideal Forms are the transcendent sources of unconditioned positive value in 
our phenomenal experience. The value in question is not limited to moral 
value as in goodness, or aesthetic value as in beauty, or religious value as in 
piety, instead being broadly consistent with anything of intrinsic value: e.g., 
                                                          
28 This is, in fact, exactly how the specific cases are intended. While my certitude may smack of privileged 
insight into intentions, it is nothing more than a reflection of the fact, perhaps bearing repetition here, that 
“Thesleff 2013” is really “Alican and Thesleff 2013.” See the end of this section for more on the function of 
the specific cases. 
29 The construct/entity distinction is a matter of perspective: Those who do not share Plato’s commitment 
to the existence of Forms could well take them to be constructs conjured up by Plato in thought 
experiments. Those who agree with Plato that the Forms are objectively real could instead characterize 
them as entities discovered through such thought experiments. I leave the matter open here (by supplying 
parenthetical alternatives) because the existence of the Forms is not relevant to the question(s) I am 
exploring in this paper. 
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justice, temperance, knowledge (Phaedrus 247d). This makes Ideal Forms the 
objectively real and metaphysically perfect paradigms of all that is good in 
and of itself. 
• Conceptual Forms are reified concepts with an ontological eminence falling 
short of Ideal Forms. They, too, are objectively real, but their phenomenal 
manifestations are not intrinsically valuable. Typical examples are types (e.g., 
man, bed, fire) and properties (e.g., tall, hard, hot), though types are not 
necessarily restricted to natural kinds and may include various other 
phenomena, such as events, actions, experiences, and possibly even mental 
states. 
• Relational Forms are ontological categories making up and sustaining the 
cosmos as the noumenal building blocks of reality. They come in pairs of 
correlative contrasts representing fundamental universal concepts, as in the 
metaphysically productive pairing of rest with motion, or of same with other, 
all familiar from the megista genē (μέγιστα γένη) of the Sophist (254d–e). The 
apparent opposition is complementary rather than contradictory. 
 
These are types of Forms in the sense that they represent various episodes in Plato’s 
lifelong experimentation with abstraction. The spotlight is on Ideal Forms. The other 
two can sometimes approximate to Ideal Forms under certain conditions through a 
phenomenon or process called “ontological ascent” (cf. 2013, 22 [n. 21], 43, for the 
term; 2013, 29–33, 42, 43–44, for discussion and details). But this does not blur the 
boundaries between the three categories. Most importantly, Ideal Forms are the only 
ones with intrinsic value. The other two may come to embody nearly all the features of 
Ideal Forms (2013, 27, cf. 26–29), but never intrinsic value, which is had either naturally 
(essentially) or not at all. Something that is not intrinsically valuable may come to be 
valued for something that is, perhaps eventually coming by association to be valued for 
itself, but that is not the same as its being valuable simply in virtue of what it is, that is, 
without the intermediation of the facilitating association. 
It is this emphasis on value that precludes negative Forms. Negative Ideal Forms 
are strictly out of the question, since positive intrinsic value is a defining feature of this 
category. But that is not all. The emphasis on value is so extensive as to shape Plato’s 
tendencies in reifying universals in the first place (2013, 29–33, 44). Not all concepts are 
Forms, just the important ones. And the importance is the importance to Plato. He 
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decides, because it is his “theory” (labeled as such by convention but actually more of 
an outlook than a theory). This explanation may seem simplistic. But that is how 
simple the matter really is. Forms come from among the concepts Plato finds 
universally important, significant, or valuable in some way or other. The odds are 
stacked from the outset against negative concepts. Perhaps some may turn out to be 
Conceptual Forms, but none can qualify as an Ideal Form, while Relational Forms are 
not quite apposite to the discussion.30  
This allusion to the possibility of negative Conceptual Forms is intended only in 
admission of the fuzzy distinction between concepts and Conceptual Forms.31  It is not 
a standard feature of Thesleff ’s analysis of the negative in Plato. Then again, no 
attempt to separate concepts from Conceptual Forms in the Platonic corpus can be 
entirely free of doubt and hesitation. Thesleff admits, for example, that “anything Plato 
could and wanted to conceptualize ended up as a Conceptual Form” (2013, 31). Does 
this include negative concepts? Not by intention, but it does seem open to that 
implication if one wishes to force the issue, since anything at all, and thereby negative 
concepts as well, would fall under an unqualified reference to “anything.” 
Against this, however, we must note, if we are fair, that the admission just quoted 
does not contradict the emphasis on Plato’s value assignments and preference patterns. 
On the contrary, it is that emphasis. In that regard, it could also be interpreted against 
negative Conceptual Forms. For how “could” Plato have conceptualized what 
remained below his threshold of significance, or importance, as negative concepts 
clearly would have been? And why would he have “wanted to” conceptualize what he 
did not find valuable?32  Value, the primary qualification for proper reification, is not 
simply lacking but actually reversed in what would otherwise be negative Forms (of any 
sort). Who would want a good-for-nothing Form? Worse, who would want a bad 
Form? Not Thesleff. And, so he tells us, not Plato either. 
Hardly any hesitation, as in distinguishing concepts from Conceptual Forms, 
                                                          
30 Relational Forms may perchance appear to be relevant because they come in pairs of contrasting 
elements, one of which is “dominant” in relation to the other. The contrast, however, is between 
complementary counterparts, not polar opposites. One “dominates” but the other is not negative. The 
most extensive coverage of the distinction is in Alican and Thesleff (2013, 40, cf. 35–38, 41–42). 
31 See Alican and Thesleff (2013, 29–33) for a discussion of the ontology of concept-formation in Plato as 
“conceptualization and formalization” (reification). See Alican (2014, 44–52) for further analysis of the 
same process as a “continuum of abstraction.” 
32 Thesleff denies that bad or evil holds much interest for Plato (1999, 28 [= 2009, 412]). He claims that 
Plato is interested in just the opposite: “minimizing the significance of ‘evil’” (1999, 32 [= 2009, 417] n. 63). 
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accompanies Thesleff ’s resolve to reject negative Forms: “Plato is evidently reluctant to 
speak of negatively valued conceptual Forms” (1999, 51 [= 2009, 435–436]; 
“conceptual” begins with a capital “C” from 2013 onward). While this observation is 
specifically in the context of Phaedo 105d, Thesleff ’s overall outlook shows him to be 
identifying a general tendency in Plato in addition to assessing usage in that passage 
(perhaps drawing on or confirming a previously identified general tendency in the 
process of assessing usage in that passage). He supplies the broader context for the 
observation before sharing the observation itself: “Here [Phaedo] as elsewhere Plato is 
unable to imagine a cosmic opposition of ‘good’ and ‘evil’” (1999, 49 [= 2009, 434]). 
Note also that “Plato sees the conflict between opposites as a matter of the lower level” 
(1999, 50 [= 2009, 435]) and “takes it for granted that there is no antagonism or conflict 
of opposites on the higher level” (1999, 52 [= 2009, 436]). Since all Forms, and not just 
Ideal Forms, occupy the higher level, this leaves no room for negative Conceptual 
Forms. 
Even if Thesleff could be read as somehow leaving the door open for (a few) 
negative Conceptual Forms, this would be as far as negative concepts could go, and it is 
neither certain nor likely, just conceivable from our perspective, that they would make 
it that far. Thesleff is confident that he has enough evidence to conclude that there are 
“certainly no Ideas [= ‘Ideal Forms’ in 2013 and afterwards] (except in playful thought 
experiments) for negative notions such as ‘violence,’ ‘ignorance,’ or indeed ‘evil’” (1999, 
120 [= 2009, 502]). “Mark well,” he urges, “there is no αὐτό τό κακὸν, αὐτό τό ἄδικον 
for Plato” (1999, 52 [= 2009, 436]). 
As for the cases where Thesleff goes through original passages with putative 
negative Forms in an effort to suggest alternative interpretations (2013, 40–42), they are 
not so much individual proofs or arguments against the possibility of negative Forms as 
they are systematic demonstrations of how to dig beneath the surface to avoid 
misinterpretation. They are intended as heuristic guidelines for reading examples that 
might otherwise be misconstrued as negative Forms. The idea is that the putative 
negative Forms we tend to come across in various dialogues are not proper Forms but 
abstractions somehow falling short of Forms. To be plausible, this would have to be a 
general shortcoming, not a collection of random problems. In other words, the 
abstractions failing to qualify as Forms would have to have a common explanation for 
that failure. And that common explanation is the lack of positive value in the examples 
rejected. Positive value that is intrinsic comes with automatic qualification as an Ideal 
Form. Any other association with positive value, as well as the neutral absence thereof, 
is up for consideration in connection with one of the other two types of Forms. But 
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outright negative value is not. 
4. SORTING OUT THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY 
My resistance to negative Forms is not reducible to the song and dance of my 
metaphorical response to Nails: Ain’t no sunshine when she’s gone. My suspicions, I 
confess, originated precisely at that level of abstraction as a devil’s advocate. But they 
matured through the dialectical orientation against negativity — particularly against 
systematic negativity and negative causal principles — in the general vision I have been 
advocating with Thesleff regarding a tripartite classification of Forms at the upper level 
of a monistic reality.33  Objective checks and balances, beyond any in the general vision 
mentioned, have also been instrumental. The ones I have in mind may not confirm my 
suspicions beyond a doubt for outside observers, but they do keep me from feeling bad 
about remaining skeptical, or even in complete dissent, on the matter of ideal 
negativity. 
One such example, prejudicing me against a singular superordinate negative force 
or Form, though not against any ordinary ones, comes late in the Republic. The relevant 
passage constitutes part of a proof (608c–611a) for the immortality of the soul, drawing 
on the major premise (609a–b) that the soul, like everything else, is susceptible of 
destruction only through its own evil and not through any other (and therefore not 
through a generic one).34  Everything, we are told, has a specific evil common and 
peculiar to its kind, and this is the only way anything can be destroyed at all. These 
customized patterns of destruction, then, leave no need, nor much room, for a broadly 
applicable destructive force.35  
While this particular appeal, if successful, works only against a cosmic destroyer, 
and not against specific negative Forms, in fact, confirming specific negative forces, 
others tend to be relevant in either case. For example, another passage diverting me 
from idealizing the bad, be it as a supreme destroyer or as an ordinary one, is the 
scientific explanation of disease: chemical imbalance at an elemental level (Timaeus 
82a–b). This account, presumed obvious in the dramatic setting, is said to apply not 
                                                          
33 See Alican and Thesleff (2013) for our collaboration, Alican (2014, 2015, 2017) for my elaboration. 
34 See Alican (2012, 458–462) for further discussion of this proof (the “customized patterns of destruction 
argument” of the Republic). 
35 There may still be both a need and some room for a broadly applicable destructive force if the way that 
destruction works is through the participation of these customized patterns of destruction (together with 
the unique evil inherent in each) in a superordinate Form of the bad (or of evil). In that case, this would 
not be a conclusive counterexample, and could, in fact, go the other way. 
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just to disease but also to degeneration in the broadest sense, actually to an “infinity of 
diseases and degenerations” (82b). As for diseases of the soul, even there, the cause is a 
privation, or at least a deficiency, specifically of intelligence, a shortage of which results 
in folly (anoia [ἄνοια]), identified as a disease, which, in turn, exhibits itself either as 
madness (mania [μανία]) or as ignorance (amathia [ἀμαθία]) (86b). 
The ultimate destruction, that of the soul, is envisaged in one part of the Phaedo as a 
breakdown or dispersal of sorts, hence again as a systemic problem, in this case a 
structural one arising without external intervention and fully explicable within the 
system in which it occurs. One of the dialogue’s several proofs for the immortality of 
the soul is dedicated exclusively to alleviating the fear of such destruction (78b–80b for 
the main argument, 80c–84b for the accompanying mythos).36  That sort of 
destruction, however, is not consistent with a universal principle of destruction, which 
must be effective beyond the things that come apart on their own. 
Later in the same dialogue, after it is established (to apparent dramatic satisfaction) 
that the soul is not the kind of thing that is subject to dispersal or disintegration 
(because it has no parts or particles to break down or come apart), the discussion shifts 
to whether the soul can perish in some other way (whatever that may be). The 
destroyer then contemplated is death (105b–107a), a destructive force unique to living 
things, thus relevant only to the soul, with or without a body, and therefore not 
applicable to anything else, which is to say, not generically universal.37  Hence, death is 
at most an ordinary Form, not a superordinate one, though it may not be a Form at all, 
certainly not an Ideal Form. 
The role of death as a destructive force, even without universal relevance, may 
seem to contradict the position I am defending against ordinary negative Forms, but 
not so much when one considers the conclusion of the argument (105b–107a): Death 
fails! Not a single soul is ever destroyed by it, not one life extinguished. This is arguably 
a reason not to take death seriously as a Platonic Form: Life is entirely successful in 
animating the soul, while death invariably fails to terminate it. This would make death 
the only Form not to fulfill its function. 
The most striking example of all awaits in the Symposium (188a–b), where we learn 
                                                          
36 A critical analysis of this proof (the “analogic argument” of the Phaedo) is available, among other places, 
in Alican (2012, 418–424) and Alican (2015, 316–320), each providing a different perspective, though not in 
contradiction of the other. 
37 See Alican (2012, 446–450) for further discussion of the corresponding proof (the “causal argument” of 
the Phaedo, often referred to simply as the “final argument”) and Alican (2012, 391–491) for extended 
commentary on the Phaedo in general. 
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that even love (eros) can cause death and destruction, or possibly that only love can do 
so, though the latter is open to interpretation. It may be objected, of course, that this is 
the position of Eryximachus, whose corpus presence as an interlocutor is limited to a 
single dialogue, which then counts against the possibility of his speaking for Plato. I will 
gladly concede this point if the alternative is to enter into a debate on how to pick and 
choose between the dramatic mouthpieces traditionally attributed to Plato, but I might 
then ask the opposition to demonstrate the reliability of its own witnesses for what Plato 
thought. 
Whatever we are supposed to make of that, it is ironic, no doubt, that love should 
be a destructive force. And it is doubly ironic that the good doctor should even be 
speaking of destruction, given that his sworn duty is first and foremost to do no harm 
and then to prevent it or, failing that, to reverse it. The dialogue’s various references to 
Apollo (190e, 197a) and Asclepius (186e) are quite likely intended to emphasize that 
irony. The manifest irony here may only undermine the presentation of love as a 
destructive force, but the cumulative evidence moves me to question the attribution of 
a cosmic causality of any sort to destruction. 
I do not think the foregoing examples show a Form of the bad (or of evil) to be 
inconceivable. I think they show it to be unnecessary, and hence, its requirement to be 
unjustified. Some of them, or perhaps all of them together, may even overcome, or at 
least escape, the challenge Nails poses: “The privation view cannot be right for Plato 
because the texts do not allow it” (2013, 96). The references Nails (2013, 96–99) 
provides do indeed support that conclusion. Yet as is often the case with Plato, 
something that is not allowed in some of the texts can be allowed in others. This seems 
to be the case here. 
That is why the subtitle of this paper is “Does Plato Make Room for Negative 
Forms in His Ontology?” and not “Is There Any Room for Negative Forms in Plato’s 
Ontology?” The same choice governs the opening question of the paper: “Are there 
any negative Forms in Plato?” This is not the same as asking whether any negative 
Forms could conceivably be ascribed to the ontological scheme discernible in any of 
the dialogues. It is even less like asking without context whether there are any negative 
Forms at all. The question is whether Plato, in fact, recognizes them. 
The reason I have avoided alternative formulations is not that I am against trying 
to figure out what to make of something left open in the texts. If I were to rule that out, 
I myself would have very little to say about Plato. My intention, rather, has been to 
emphasize that the ideal is to determine Plato’s own position. This is not always 
possible. But it is still better to keep working with what Plato said, building on it where 
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both necessary and possible at the same time, as opposed to moving straight to what he 
should have said, which is typically an instantiation of what we think a reasonable 
person would have said under the circumstances. 
When we are not sure what Plato’s position is, we are often tempted to work out the 
most reasonable position as a substitute. Other things being equal, the most reasonable 
position is indeed a fitting tribute to Plato. Like all of us, however, Plato never once, I 
am sure, said anything that did not seem reasonable to him. It is good to be charitable, 
better still when it is needed, but it may not always be appropriate. We have much to 
gain from remaining open to the possibilities. We should, for example, be prepared to 
work with less obvious alternatives if they fit the context better than those that seem 
more compelling from our point of view, or if they have greater explanatory power, 
especially in regard to the whole or to a helpfully large or relevant portion of it. 
This is the kind of choice facing us with Nails (2013) and Thesleff (2013). Nails’s 
answer is intuitively more appealing. Thesleff ’s answer, on the other hand, has greater 
explanatory power. It tells us more about Plato than we would know without Thesleff. 
And it tells us more about Plato than does Nails. Both Nails and Thesleff tell us what to 
do with putative negative Forms. And they both say what they say in connection with 
something more important they have to say. The difference is in this more important 
thing each is after in the process of evaluating negative Forms. 
Nails tells us that the unhypothetical first principle of the all is not (identical to) the 
Form of the good. There is room besides for a Form of the bad and for countless things 
that are not covered either by the Form of the good or by the Form of the bad. This is 
informative. Thesleff tells us that the standard scholarly approach to Forms as a 
uniform metaphysical designation is an oversimplification ignoring philosophically 
significant differences. Forms come instead in three different varieties together 
occupying the upper level of reality in a unitary world where each kind constitutes a 
metaphysical category with a special relevance to the way the world is. This, too, is 
informative. I find myself better informed, or more extensively so, with Thesleff ’s 
answer. The reason that I do is that I can do more with his answer than I can with 
Nails’s. Assuming that Nails is right, I learn how to distinguish between the 
unhypothetical first principle of the all and the Form of the good. Assuming that 
Thesleff is right, I learn how to think about the Forms in general and thereby about the 
world according to Plato. The Forms have too much to do with how Plato’s world 
works for Thesleff ’s answer not to be regarded as having greater explanatory power 
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than Nails’s answer, that is, as telling us more about Plato.38  
Plausibility, of course, is essential. Explanatory power is merely a tie-breaker. We 
cannot condone the wildest theories just because they explain a lot, making us 
reluctant to give up their implications. Nails’s theory is far from wild while telling us 
something we (most of us) did not know or notice.39  The reconstruction Nails offers is 
not just plausible but also desirable and even beautiful. A negative hierarchy of Forms 
is the perfect complement for a positive hierarchy of Forms. It is simple, 
straightforward, and elegant. Yet Plato is not obligated to be simple, straightforward, or 
elegant. Nor does he have to be reasonable from a particular perspective. There are 
different ways of being reasonable. 
Thesleff ’s Plato is less predictable without being unreasonable. There is nothing 
unreasonable, for example, about favoring positive abstractions, discounting negative 
abstractions, and thinking hard about the neutral ones, eventually sorting them out on 
a case-by-case basis. It is our own predilection for closure, for structure, for symmetry, 
that prejudices us against an open, fluid, and asymmetrical scheme for the Forms. It 
may seem strange from our perspective that Plato should reject negative Forms while 
accepting their positive counterparts. But what is even stranger is to humor Plato on 
something as fanciful as the Forms only to take him to task for leaving some out. If we 
are going to allow him the most outlandish ontological concoctions in the history of 
philosophy, we are going to have to let him handle them however he sees fit. 
Asking whether Plato accepts both positive and negative Forms is not like asking 
whether he accepts both odd and even numbers. There is no independent criterion of 
truth in Forms as there is in numbers. The Forms are his show. The positive and the 
negative of it is his business. Numbers, on the other hand, are everybody’s concern. It is 
not up to Plato to judge the odd and the even, designating one series as numbers, the 
other as not. Concepts are closer to numbers in that regard. We do not need Plato’s 
blessing to figure out whether there are both positive and negative concepts, not to 
mention neutral ones. The Forms, however, are not concepts. They are what he says 
                                                          
38 It may be tempting to object that Nails, in addition to the distinction between the unhypothetical first 
principle of the all and the Form of the good, gives us negative Forms. She does. But what is at stake here 
is whether she is right to do so. We cannot decide the matter by making the outcome a part of that 
decision. And even if that were okay, any nominal advantage for Nails in confirming negative Forms 
would be fully offset by a correlative advantage for Thesleff in ruling out negative Forms, which is no less 
informative than accepting them. 
39 I am not saying that she is right. I am saying that her thesis has substantial explanatory power provided 
that she is right. 
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they are. And he does not say very much. We have to fill in the blanks, but we do not 
get to impose our personal preferences. We cannot make him take the negative ones 
just because that is what we would do. We have to fill in the blanks the way we think he 
might, even when that is not the way we think is right. 
This seems to be the place to fulfill the promise of summoning my own Plato where 
the alternatives are both acceptable on the basis of reason and scholarship. My Plato 
reserves a special place for the positive that precludes the negative, not necessarily in 
our phenomenal experience but certainly among the Forms. What may read like 
negative Forms, including the bad, are the rudiments of what we now call concepts. 
This is not to say that my Plato clearly distinguishes between concepts and Forms. He 
does, but not clearly. What is quite clear, though, is that not every abstraction interests 
him. And this last bit is true not just of my Plato but also of the actual philosopher. 
Plato, the only one we have, was fascinated by some abstractions, not so much by 
others. He may well have decided that Forms are too precious to be tainted with 
negativity. 
A negative Form is not a positive Form with the charge reversed any more than a 
dead person is a living person with the animation reversed. Or perhaps that is exactly 
what these things are, but neither one of them is then the same sort of thing as its 
analogic counterpart, nor even remotely similar to it. A negative Form is not a Form at 
all, just as a dead person is not a person at all. It might even be said to be the opposite 
of a Form, or the privation of it, much like the way a dead person is just what is left 
behind when the actual person is gone, leaving us first with a corpse, if that, and 
eventually with nothing more than a memory. Plato does not have to count as a Form 
the nebulous privation, or worse, outright opposite, of what he takes to be a Form. And 
he does not. This is what being a Form is all about: what matters to Plato. 
We get the clearest glimpse of what matters to him in the central myth of the 
Phaedrus (246e–249d) mentioned earlier. The Forms are so special that even the gods 
trek out to the far reaches of the cosmos to gaze upon them (246e–247e). And the show 
is a rare privilege for mortals, very few of whom make it all the way out to this cosmic 
inspiration point as disincarnate souls (248a–249d). Everything worthwhile is there for 
all to see. The Forms we get to behold, if we manage to complete the journey (as good 
philosophers), are justice and knowledge and beauty and so on. There is no fire or 
water. There is no mud or dirt. And there is certainly no evil or ugliness. 
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5. THE RATIONALE OF TAKING SIDES 
I have decisively sided with Thesleff, but I have not really attacked Nails. I could 
certainly position myself more vigorously against her, ending the paper in steadfast 
opposition. This is not because I am particularly clever but because the paper is almost 
there anyway. Giving it a little nudge at the end may help emphasize just how wrong 
Nails is. And it might be better for me to do that here since I have unequivocally 
rejected negative Forms in collaboration with Thesleff elsewhere (Alican and Thesleff 
2013). What I have said here is basically a defense of what we had said there. I could 
now make all this work against Nails if any of it ever worked at all. But that would 
conceal an important part of what I think about the matter. 
My understanding is that Plato rejects negative Forms while appearing 
inadvertently to accept them. This gives Nails perfectly good reasons (2013, 95–101) for 
concluding not just that Plato puts up with negative Forms but that he revels in them 
with flair, devising a systematic hierarchy with the Form of the bad at the top of a 
negative superstructure. Her own exposition is not quite so explicit, but the basic 
ingredients are all there. My reading is based largely on her assignment of an 
extraordinary status to both the Form of the good and the Form of the bad. Just as she 
identifies the Form of the good as a “superordinate” Form (2013, 95), an “extra-
strength” Form (100), and a “superior” (to being) Form (95, 100), so too, she designates 
the Form of the bad a “robust” Form (96, 99, 100). While she does not, in so many 
words, say that this is all about a superstructure of positive Forms in contrast to a 
superstructure of negative Forms, both subsumed under the unhypothetical first 
principle of the all, she leaves us with exegetical elements that come together in 
precisely that arrangement. 
This is borne out by her acknowledgment of “a hierarchy of forms, with the good 
at the top” (2013, 95), suggesting that what she is exploring with the bad, especially 
since she makes the Form of the bad the universal explanation of negativity, is a 
parallel hierarchy of negative Forms, with the bad at the top. Strictly speaking, she is 
after an account of “destruction” (2013, 94, 99, 100), not of “negativity,” but she would 
need the bad to explain negativity no less than she would need it to explain 
destruction, which is a less general concept covered by negativity. However that may 
be, my interpretation of what she is doing here comes more from admiration than from 
antagonism. If I have overstated the role she assigns to the bad, I have also overstated 
my admiration. 
What Nails makes of negative Forms, with or without a negative superstructure, is 
consistent with the textual evidence, especially with the parts of it she brings to our 
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attention in support of her thesis. I am nevertheless satisfied beyond a doubt that Plato 
rejected negative Forms, or from a different perspective, that he avoided making any, 
or from yet another, that he never detected any. How can I believe the opposite of what 
I have just admitted to be supported by perfectly good reasons? One explanation is 
that, “perfectly good” being a figure of speech conveying adequacy rather than 
perfection, I take the opposite view to be supported by much better reasons. Another is 
that even though I reject a negative superstructure of Forms, this is because I reject 
negative Forms, not because I reject the structure itself in a possible world where there 
are negative Forms. 
The scenarios in Nails and Thesleff are both plausible in the sense and to the 
extent that the textual evidence cannot be said with certainty to preclude either 
reading. The reason I side with Thesleff against Nails, hence the reason I believe Plato 
rejected negative Forms, is that I would rather give up a Plato embracing negative 
Forms than to give up a Plato recognizing the inherent nature and value of the 
universe. Negative Forms undermine the metaphysical, moral, spiritual, religious, and 
aesthetic value Plato imputes to the universe in his vision of reality. The value in 
question, namely the good in the universe, is ingrained with unmistakable flamboyance 
in its very essence and constitution. This is a world created by design and shaped in 
accordance with the dictates of reason and goodness. Negative Forms simply do not 
belong in such a world, which is best represented, or at least better so, by the evaluative 
reification patterns of the ontological model sketched here with a gradation of unitary 
reality defined and held together by various different kinds of Forms, not one type or 
token of which is negative. 
These are not my personal prejudices. I take my cue from the demiurge, who 
employs reason in the service of the good, and both in the creation of the universe, 
where the good emerges without rival as the supreme causal principle (Timaeus 29d–
30c). This is why I find a Plato operating with a richer ontology, one built on categories 
of universal value and significance as against a homogeneous collection of 
indiscriminately reified abstractions, to be not just a better philosopher but also the 
actual philosopher who still has us discussing a thought experiment he introduced at 
the dawn of philosophy.40  I am not willing to give that up for a more elegant 
                                                          
40 There is, of course, something to be said, at least with respect to western philosophy, for identifying the 
dawn with Thales, or really with any of the Presocratics, or perhaps with a combination of them. There is 
no harm, however, in extending the duration of the dawn to include Plato. If we define it too narrowly, or 
push it back too far, we might have to make do, for our own part, with bumbling around in the twilight of 
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philosopher or even for a more reasonable one. 
Nor am I the only one to saddle Plato with an organic connection between value 
and reality. Burnyeat, to cite just one of the eminent commentators preceding me, 
stands firmly behind the same observation: “It is beyond dispute that in the Timaeus 
value is part of ‘the furniture of the world’” (2000, 66). This line of furniture, to consult 
Burnyeat further, is evidently quite fashionable outside the Timaeus as well: “Plato, like 
Aristotle and the Stoics after him, really did believe there is value in the world as it is 
objectively speaking, that values are part of what modern philosophers like to call ‘the 
furniture of the world’” (2000, 8). Let me add that, the craftsman being divine and the 
Forms being perfect, the furniture comes out rather well. It is beautiful, functional, and 
practically indestructible. Every last piece combines good taste with expert 
craftsmanship in charge of superlative materials. There is no negativity by design in 
Plato, and since the Forms are essential to the design of the universe, there are no 
negative Forms. 
 
necipalican@gmail.com 
Istanbul 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
philosophy. A dawn with Plato makes it plausible, at least for a while, to pretend that the sun is still 
shining. 
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